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This paper investigates the nature of balance of payments crises in
regimes with capital controls. It extends earlier work on capital controls by
assuming that households manage their consumption and asset portfolios to
maximize intertemporal utility. Our main result is that capital controls are
effective in delaying, but not preventing, a breakdown of a fixed exchange















The vast and growing literature on balance of payments crises focuses on the
incompatibility of persistent budgetary deficits and fixed exchange rates. Under
the standard assumption of high international capital mobility, a government that
finances its deficit through domestic credit expansion and simultaneously pegs the
exchange rates, will experience a simultaneous offsetting loss of foreign exchange
reserves. Eventually, a minimum level of official reserve holdings will be reached,
and the government will be forced to allow the exchange rate to float (assuming
that there is no correction of the underlying budget deficit). The transition to
floating rates typically involves a speculative attack on the central bank reserves in
the finstantt? (or period) just before the float begins.
The assumption of internationally mobile capital is critical to the adjustment
mechanism just outlined, at two points. First, the domestic credit expansion that
finances the budget deficit generally leads to an immediate offset of official reserves
because domestic agents are free to convert domestic currency into foreign
financial assets at the pegged exchange rate. Second, the possibility of a
"speculative attacktt, in which there is a large, discrete loss of central bank
reserves, also depends on the ability of domestic residents instantly to convert part
of their money stock into foreign assets on the eve of the exchange rate collapse.
It is often for these reasons that governments resort to capital controls to help
to maintain an exchange rate peg. By preventing the instantaneous conversion of
domestic money into foreign financial assets, governments try to preserve their-2-
central bank reserves for a longer period of time, and thereby forestall the
exchange rate collapse. Under tight capital controls, according to which domestic
residents are not allowed to hold foreign assets, the central bank loses foreign
reserves via current account deficits on1y. Reserves can decline only gradually,
with a current account deficit, rather than in the sudden step of a speculative
attack, in which part of the domestic money stock is traded for the central bank's
foreign exchange.
As many governments have learned, however, the use of exchange controls does
not generally prevent the collapse of the fixed rate (though in some cases it may),
but rather it delays the collapse and changes the adjustment mechanism. With
exchange controls and fixed rates, domestic credit expansion doesleadto a rise in
domestic real money balances, since the increase in money cannot be converted to
foreign assets. The buildup in real money balances leads to a rise in domestic
absorption and a current account deficit. The deficit, in turn, leads to reserve
losses of the central bank, and the eventual collapse of the fixed rate. However, the
collapse comes smoothly in this case, with reserves trickling down to the minimum
permissible level, rather than being exhausted in a single stroke by a speculative
attack.
Moreover, the exchange rate behavior is different in the cases of free versus
restricted capital mobility. With free capital mobility, the transition from the
fixed to floating rate occurs without a discrete jump in the exchange rate, while in
the capital control case, there is a discrete depreciation of the currency at the-3-
moment of breakdown of the exchange rate peg.1 It should be clear why an
anticipated discrete depreciation is possible only in the presence of capital controls:
if agents are free to swap money for foreign assets, they would always do so the
moment before an anticipated depreciation, thus causing it to occur before the
"anticipated" date. In equilibrium with capital mobility, the speculative attack is
timed precisely so that asset markets clear continuously without any discrete
anticipated exchange rate change.
Despite the widespread use of capital controls to forestall exchange rate
changes, there has been relatively little modelling of the effects of capital controls
on the balance of payments cirses. Wyplosz (1986) provides the pioneering model
in this area. This paper extends that work by couching the analysis in a model in
which private agents are intertemporal utility maximizers, in contrast to the
Wyplosz model in which private sector behavior is not derived from utility
maximization. For this purpose we use the elegant model introduced by Calvo
(1986, 1987), and follow his notation closely.
Section II of this paper introduces the Calvo model, and section III uses the
model to analyze a balance of payments crisis under the standard assumption of
complete capital mobility. Section IV then repeats the analysis under the
alternative assumption of zero captial mobility, and the adjustment paths in the
1. The absence of a discrete jump in the exchange rate holds strictly only in continuous time,
deterministic models. In discrete time (Obstfeld, 1984), or with stochastic monetary policy
(Penati and Pennachi, 1986), discrete changes in the exchange rate may occur as equilibrium
outcomes in models with free capital mobility.-4-
two cases are compared in some detail. Section V offers some conclusions and a
discussion of possible extensions.
II. THE MODEL
The basic model is based on Calvo (1987). We have a small open economy with
perfect mobility of capital and goods. There is a single representative consumer
with infinite time horizon whose utility at time t, U, is
=fu(c3)e_r(8_t)ds (1)
where c3 is real consumption at time s.
There is only one good in the world. Since this good is freely tradable,
domestic inflation rate is, by purchasing power parity, equal to the rate of
exchange depreciationassuming zero world inflation rate. The world interest
rate, denoted by r, is assumed to be constant. Therefore, the domestic interest
rate, which is the opportunity cost of holding money, is r + by interest
arbitrage. Note that for convenience, the subjective rate of time preference in (1)
and the world interest rate are assumed to be equal.
Since goods are assumed to be perishable, foreign bonds and money are the
only means of storing wealth. Thus, the real wealth, a1 ,is:
a1 =m+b1 (2)
where m1 is real money balance held by the consumer and b is real bond holdings.
at evolves according to the following relation:-5-
=y+rb+g—€m—c (3)
where y is a constant flow of real output (GDP), g is real lump-sum transfer
payment from government, and em is inflation tax paid by the consumer. Using
(2), eq. (3) can be rewritten as follows.
=y+ra+g—(r+e)m—c (4)
The consumer faces a cash-in-advance constraint, according to which
mt￿act, a>O (5)
Money is return-dominated by bond so long as the domestic interest rate is
positive. Thus, (5) will be an equality as long as r +e> 0 ,2
Solvingthe problem of maximizing (1) subject to the constraints (4) and (5), we
get the following first order condition.
U'(Ct)= X [1 + a(r+et) ] (6)
xt = 0
From this condition we know that given a path of g and y ,realconsumption
remains constant so long as the inflation rate is constant, and the higher is the
inflation rate the lower is real consumption.
The other component of the domestic economy is the government. The
government holds foreign bonds as reserves and is committed to two roles. One is
to transfer a lump-sum amount g in each period according to a predetermined
2. Since we are going to confine our analysis to the case of a fixed or depreciating exchange rate,
this is a reasonable assumption.-6-
schedule and the other is to maintain a fixed exchange peg. These government
roles are financed by interest from bond holdings, new money printing and
inflation tax.3 The real government reserves, denoted by k,canbe changed by
two ways. One is by the flow of government surplus or deficit. The other is by the
stock adjustment of the consumer to buy or sell foreign bonds. Thus, k evolves
according to the following equation ,except for the points where m jumps.
IC =rk+rh+€m—g (7)
At points where m takes a jump of m
(8)
Following Krugman (1978) we will assume that there is a lower bound to k ,which
will be assumed to be zero.4
k ￿ 0 ,tE (_o,o) (9)
Since under the fixed exchange regime the government should meet the demand
to exchange domestic currency for foreign currency at a predetermined exchange
rate, the ability of the government to defend a given level of fixed exchange rate is
limited by the availability of foreign reserves. Therefore, when the government
runs out of reserves, the fixed exchange regime is no longer sustainable. Unless the
government adopts some corrective measures, it has to allow the exchange rate to
3. Of course, inflation tax is not applicable under fixed exchange peg. However, once the fixed
exchange regime breaks down and the float begins, inflation tax is the major source of
government revenue.
4. A lower bound of zero is the case when the government cannot borrow reserves.-7-
float.
The net claims against the rest of the world of this economy, denoted by w ,is
the sum of the private and government holdings of bonds, that is, b +k.Since the
gross national product of this economy is y +rw,thecurrent account balance
defined as GNPminusdomestic absorption can be written as
=y+rw—c (10)
For this economy to stay in steady state under fixed exchange regime, tbshould
be equal to zero. It follows from eq. (10) that real consumption should be constant
at y +rw.By the cash-in-advance constraint, m is also constant at
m =a(y+rw).Thesteady state economy also requires that k be equal to
zero. Since ih= 0in the steady state, and 0under the fixed exchange regime,
the level of government expenditure which is compatible with steady state under
fixed exchange peg is, from eq.(7), j= rk,which means the government should
maintain a balanced budget.
III. BALANCE OF PA YMENTS CRISIS UNDER FREE CAPITAL MOBILITY
We assume that up to time zero the economy has been following a steady state
path along which the consumer consumes exactly the amount of his personal
income and government maintains a balanced budget. As a result, bond holdings
of the government and the consumer are kept constant at the positive levels of k
and b respectively. At time zero, there is an unanticipated permanent increase in
the transfer payment from(=rk)to+g,which will be financed by an-8-
increase in the money supply. Since the consumer will not hold all of the increased
money, the government will eventually lose all of its reserves if it maintains the
increased level of transfer.
The consumer knows that the fixed exchange regime will collapse at time T and
that starting from time T the exchange rate will depreciate at a constant rate of
Sinceconsumption and money holdings will be constant from (6), and since k will
be equal to zero, the only source of government revenue to support the positive
amount of transfer after the collapse is inflation tax of the amount €m .Thus,to
keep the nonnegative reserve constraint of (9),shouldbe uniquely set at
g+IXg
(11) m m
For the sake of concreteness, we will investigate the particular case of log
utility, that is, u (c)in c .Aswas discussed earlier, consumption is constant in
the intervals [0, T) and [T,c') .We'lldenote consumption in these intervals as x
and z respectively. Then, using (6), we get
x(1+ar)=z[1+a(r+€)} (12)
As for k ,itjumps at time zero as the consumer adjusts his money holding to
his new consumption profile. Thus, k at time zero is
=k+zk0=ìë+Im0 (13)
m0—a(x—y—rw0) ,w0=k+b
kis also expected to jump at time T. So, we distinguish between the reserve right
before the collapse, denoted by kT_ and that right after the collapse, denoted by-9-
kT+ .Integrating(7), we can get
(14)
=_a(y+rwo_x)erT_g+
Bythe zero-minimum-reserve assumption kT+0 Thus,
=kT+
—kT_=—kT_ (15)




Integrating eq. (10) we get
j+rwT (y+ rw0 —x)rT+ (17)
From the fact that the economy is in steady state after T with consumption equal
to GNP,weget
=y+rwT (18)
Substituting (18) in (17),
z—z=—(y+rwo—x)e'T (19)
Substituting (19) in (16) and equating (15) and (16), we can get
41eT_1.. =0 (20)
Solving this equation for eTT, we can finally get an expression that implicitly
determines the time till collapse, T
erT = =g+zg (21)
Lg 1g- 10-
Thefollowing equations show the behavior of some key variables during the
period before the collapse.
=y+ rb++
1
(22) 1 + ar
b= = b—°
(23) 1 + ar
k= — 1
(e' — 1)tg (24) (1 + ctr )r
Thus,we can see that consumption does not increase as much as the increase in
government transfer. This is because the consumer converts part of his bond
holdings into money at time zero to support the increase in consumption and thus
his interest income is reduced. The level of consumption after the collapse is lower
than that before the collapse, because after the collapse personal income is reduced
by the amount of inflation tax.5 Figure 1. shows the path of consumption together
with the paths of other variables of interest. Households adjust their money
holdings to the new reduced level of consumption by exchanging money holdings
for foreign bonds. This adjustment process serves as the speculative attack, which
depletes the remaining central bank reserves in an instant.
As is shown in eq. (24), the government loses its reserves over time. However,
Eq. (23) shows that bond holdings are fixed and thus, except for the speculative
attack, capital outflow is not the cause of reserve outflow. Since change in reserves
5. In other words, the opportunity cost of consumption is higher after the collapse. When the
cash-in-advanceconstraintis binding, (4)can berewritten as
a= y+ ra+g —[1+a(r+€)]c.Obviously,the cost of consumption, 1 + a(r+€)

















isthe sum of the current and capital account balance, it is obvious that the reserve
outflow before the final run on the government reserves is caused by a current
account deficit.
After the collapse, the economy will be in steady state with key variables






In conclusion, a permanent increase in government expenditure gives the
economy a nonneutrality result of reducing steady state consumption and money
holdings and raising the rate of exchange depreciation from zero to e.
IV. THE CA SE OF CAPITAL CONTR OLS
Now, we consider the case where the government imposes a control on capital
transaction at time zero. We assume that neither the capital control nor the
increase in g are expected by the consumer. We consider a very restrictive type of
capital control which prohibits the consumer from changing his bond holdings.
Thus, from time zero private bond holdings will be fixed at the level b. Since the
government continues to supply foreign exchange for trade of goods ,itis still
possible that government reserves will be eventually depleted by an accumulation
of current account deficits. We assume that the government will not remove the
capital control after the collapse.6- 12-
Onedirect result of the capital control is that the interest parity relation
between domestic and world merest rates, which holds under free capital mobility,
will not hold any more because domestic and foreign bonds are no longer freely
substitutable. To be able to solve for the domestic nominal interest rate, it is
convenient to introduce a market for domestic bonds, with a zero net supply of
bonds. Each household then demands domestic bonds in nominal amount D, and
with nominal interest rate i. Real domestic bond holdings are then d =D1IPt
In equilibrium, we will require dt0, and will find the equilibrium value of i
consistent with domestic market clearing. Note that adding such a market under
free capital mobility is superfluous. The home interest rate would simply be
it =r+ €,andd and b would be perfect substitutes.
Now, real private wealth, at ,isdefined as:
at =mt+dt (26)
at evolves according to the following equation,
=ijd+y+rb+g—€j(m+d)—c (27)
except at times of a discrete jump of the exchange rate, when we have
=aT_/(1 + y ), where-y is the instantaneous jump in the exchange rate.
Capital controls cannot prevent the eventual collapse of the fixed exchange
6. Actually, removal of capital control after the collapse does not make any difference, for
domestic currency is no longer convertible to foreign currency once the government runs out
of reserves. However, these alternative assumptions will give different results once we
introduce storable goods.- 13-
regime.Initially, the economy isin current account balance, with
=y+ r (+ k), and m0 ac0. When transfer payments are raised from
(rk)to+ Ig ,theconsumer does not instantaneously change
consumption, since consumption at time zero is constrained by the real money
stock held right before time zero. As a result, consumption at time zero remains
equal to the level of consumption the instant before, and the current account
remains in balance at t =0.Since private income at time zero is higher than
consumption, the consumer ends up with positive saving in the form of money
which can be used to increase consumption in the next instant. As consumption
increases over time, the current account deficit increases. The accumulation of
current account deficits gradually drives the reserves down to zero.
Another important result of the capital control is that, as was mentioned in the
introduction, the exchange rate can take a discrete jump in the process of the
exchange regime collapse. This is because, unlike the case under free capital
mobility, speculative attack is impossible under the capital control7 and people
cannot avoid windfall losses from the jump in exchange rate. Since real stock of
wealth, at, is defined as nominal stock of wealth divided by exchange rate, the
discrete jump in the exchange rate leads to a discrete jump in the real stock of
wealth.
7. If goods are storable, speculative attack through current account is possible. In reality, we
observe accumulation of consumer durables in expectation of devaluation. However, we
assume this possibility away by assuming that goods are perishable.- 14-
Understandingthat the consumer knows and takes as given the eventual jump
in exchange rate, y, and the timing of exchange regime collapse, T, the problem of
the representative consumer can be formulated as follows.






Solving this problem, we can get the following first order condition.




(d) p (mt —act)= 0
,p￿ 0
(e)(1+y)XT± =
whereX is the costate variable and i is the Lagrangian multiplier for the cash-in-
advance constraint.
To find the optimal path, we make a conjecture on the optimal path and show
that this path satisfies the above conditions. Our conjecture is that domestic
interest rate remains positive during the period before the collapse. Since the
return from holding money is zero under the fixed exchange regime, a positive
domestic interest rate requires that the cash-in-advance constraint hold as an- 15-
equality.This is also obvious from the complementary slackness condition.8





AppendixA proves that the conjecture we made satisfies the first order
condition in (29). In equilibrium, d= 0,and eq. (25) can be rewritten as follows.
=y+g+r—c1 (31)
Substituting mt =actin eq. (31), we can get the following differential equation for
Ct.
= c+_(y+ g + rb) (32)
1 — C0 = — m=y+ g + rb
a
Solving (32), we can get
c=y+j+rb+g(1—et) (33)
Thus, real consumption is increasing between time zero and T, but it is always less
than personal income, which equals y + r1 + + Ig .Figure2. shows the
optimal consumption path under the capital control together with the optimal






















pathsof the other variables of interest.
Since the cash-in-advance constraint is binding, mg increases over time. The
amount of money held by the consumer right before the collapse is
mT_ =a(y+ r6) + a + azg (1 (34)
Since the second term in eq. (32) is positive, mT > mT÷ .Thus,we have a
discrete jump down of the real balance at the time of collapse. Unlike the case of
free capital mobility, this jump in mt is not caused by speculative attack against
central bank reserves, for the consumer is not allowed to exchange money for
foreign bond. Instead, it is caused by a discrete jump in exchange rate. Thus,
mT_ e=( 1+ 'y )e= e (35)
mT÷
The reason why the exchange rate jumps is that when reserves run out, the
flow supply of goods to the economy drops from y + 6 —kT(CT_)to
y + rb (=CT+).Theconsumer tries in vain to buy goods with a now excess level
of money, and ends up with depreciating the currency and raising the price level.
After the collapse, the exchange rate will depreciate at the constant rate of
g/(y + rb). Note that since money holdings after the collapse under the capital
control are lower than those under free capital mobility, the steady state rate of
depreciation is higher in the case of the capital controls.
The movement of the shadow domestic interest rate under the capital control
can be tracked by the following differential equation.- 17-
di 1 ,t￿ T (36) dt a Ct
Asis discussed in appendix A, it can be easily shown that the domestic interest
remains higher than r until the time of collapse and equals the steady-state level
r +atthe moment of the collapse.
As was discussed before, there is no speculative attack under the capital
control. Hence, the exchange regime will collapse when k hits zero. Combining
(7) and (31), we can get the following path of k
rt— 1 rt — —t/u kt = — e +
e e
(37) r r+1/a
Setting kr0, we can get the following equation for the timing of collapse.
gTT + areTa =(1+ ar ) (38)
Ag
Appendix B shows that the solution to the eq. (38) is bigger than the T that
satisfies (20). Thus, the capital control specified in this section does delay the
timing of collapse, and it does so by eliminating the chance of speculative attack
and by restricting consumption and thus reducing the average current account
deficit in the period before the collapse.
V. EXTENSIONS
This paper showed how controls on capital flows can be imposed to delay the
timing of the balance of payments crisis when the crisis is inevitable. An
interesting extension may be to introduce storable goods with a positive rate of
economic depreciation. Although the existence of storable goods would not change- 18-
theresults in the case of free capital mobility, it would make a difference under
capital controls. There are two reasons why storable goods can make difference.
First, a speculative attack would be possible even under the capital control.
This is because households, facing a loss of financial wealth via devaluation, would
import storable goods as an inflation hedge. Note that unlike the case with free
capital mobility, the speculative attack would be channeled through the current
account. Second, households would have the incentive to save in the form of
money before the collapse. This is because households can convert their excess
money to storable goods right before the collapse and consume these goods
afterwards.
These two factors would present offsetting forces in determining the timing of
collapse. A speculative attack shortens the period before the collapse, whereas
additional money holdings would delay the collapse. A formal analysis will be
necessary to show which force is stronger.- 19-
APPENDIXA
We will prove that the conjecture on the optimal path we made in section IV








aF at XT = ' X=
aaT_
all aH ￿ 0 ￿ 0 ,J.L = 0






Now, we take the proposed solution in section IV. Our objective is to show that
this path satisfies the group of conditions (A2) -(A6).The most crucial part is to
show the positivity of i and the nonnegativity of p. For t> T ,wecan easily get- 20-
thefollowing values for X, p.. and i by putting )= 0and substituting the





Thus, it is obvious that our conjecture after the collapse satisfies the F.O.C.
Since the cash-in-advance constraint holds as an equality both right before and
after the collapse, we know that
CT_ =cmT_CT+ = (A7)
Combining (A7) and the relation (1 + -y)mT+ =mT_
( 1+-y ) CT+= (A8)
From(A2),
=X7_ [1 +a;T_] (A9)
CT_






Since =1+ y ,itis obvious that
CT+ XT
=1r÷=r+ (AlO)
(Ala) means that there is no jump in domestic interest rate at time T.
Differentiating (A3) with respect to time, we get- 21-
= 1+ai)+aX- (All)
Rearranging (All) using (A4) and (A5), we can get the following differential
equation for i with terminal condition.
= 'Tr+€ (A12)
dt a c
Now,we will show that i is positive for t < T. Suppose i < r for some
t < T. Then, since /c > 0 for the proposed consumption path, by (A12),
di/dt should be negative. It means that i will decrease and remains less than r.
We can see that i will keep decreasing and remain under r until time T. However,
this contradicts the terminal condition. Thus, i > r ,t< T .Thus,the
domestic interest rate will remain higher than the world interest rate r and settle
down to r +afterthe collapse. Since i is positive, it is obvious from (A2) and
(A3) that X and are also positive for t < T. Thus, the F.O.C. is also satisfied
for t < T.- 22 -
APPENDIXB
Suppose T1 is the time of collapse under free capital mobility. Then,
eTT' =
Thesolution to (38), denoted by Tc, is the zero of the following function.
f(t) =e+ aret —(1+ ur )
Sincefor t ￿0,
f'(t) =r(e'—e')> 0
we know that f is monotonically increasing. Moreover,
1(0) =—(1+ar)-2-- < 0
limf()=+00
Thuswe know that f crosses the x-axis only once and from under. Since
e_<1,t>0and g/i.g>1,
1(T1) =ar(et — <0
Therefore, Tc should be greater than- 23-
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